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Stringent regulation for mitigating greenhouse gas emissions will impose different costs across geographical
regions.  Low-carbon, environmentalist states, such as California, would bear less of the incidence
of such regulation than high-carbon  Midwestern states.   Such anticipated costs are likely to influence
Congressional voting patterns.  This paper uses several geographical data sets to document that conservative,
poor areas have higher per-capita carbon emissions than liberal, richer areas.   Representatives from
such areas are shown to have much lower probabilities of voting in favor of anti-carbon legislation.
 In the 111th Congress, the Energy and Commerce Committee consists of members who represent
high carbon districts.  These geographical facts suggest that the Obama Administration and the Waxman





Cambridge, MA 02138 
michael.cragg@brattle.com
Matthew E. Kahn
UCLA Institute of the Environment
Department of Economics
Department of Public Policy
Box 951496
La Kretz Hall, Suite 300
Los Angeles, CA 90095-1496
and NBER
mkahn@ioe.ucla.eduIntroduction 
Faced with ongoing world population growth and per-capita income growth, the world’s 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions could double over the next 50 years.
1   Scientists are calling for 
a sharp reduction in greenhouse gas emissions.  “Very roughly, stabilization at 500 ppm requires 
that emissions be held on average near the present level of seven billion tons of carbon per year 
over the next 50 years, even though they are currently on course to more than double.”
2  Since 
carbon dioxide will increase for at least the next decade or longer, this means that future 
emissions, e.g. by 2030 and thereafter, will have to be below current levels. 
The Obama Administration has announced its intention to pursue more stringent climate 
change mitigation legislation than President George W. Bush’s Administration.  The current 
Administration has explicitly stated that GHGs represent a threat to public health.
3  T o  
significantly reduce GHG emissions will require more forceful steps than past actions such as 
raising the CAFE standards for new vehicles, encouraging electric utilities to produce more 
power using renewable sources, or encouraging the use of low carbon fuels.  Direct control 
policies often have unintended consequences (Holland, Hughes and Knittel 2009).  To avoid 
these, economists have advocated transparent anti-carbon incentives such as a carbon tax or a 
comprehensive carbon dioxide cap and trade system.  In fact, both market-based (carbon   
pricing) solutions and non-price policies may be required to achieve the enormous changes 
implied by the carbon stabilization goal.  Since GHG mitigation is a global public good, a severe 
free rider problem arises (Sunstein 2007) if these policies are not very widely or homogeneously 
                                                 
1 “Stabilization Wedges: Mitigation Tools for the Next Half-Century.” Keynote Speech on Technological Options at 
the Scientific Symposium on Stabilisation of Greenhouse Gases "Avoiding Dangerous Climate Change" Met 
Office, Exeter, London. 1 Feb. 2005. 
2 Pacala, S. and Robert Socolow, “Stabilization Wedges: Solving the Climate Problem for the Next 50 Years with 
Current Technologies.” Science Vol. 305, No. 5686, 2004. p. 968-972. 
3 Tankersley, Jim. “Obama administration declares greenhouse gases a threat to public health.” Los Angeles Times 
17 Apr. 09.  adopted.  In mid-2009 the direction of carbon regulation is unclear and as this paper shows, will 
certainly be constrained by the political reality that the incidence of regulatory costs arising from 
carbon regulation is highly skewed.     
In this paper, we examine the geography of carbon emissions across the United States 
and argue that several basic facts are relevant for understanding who will bear the incidence of 
carbon regulation.  Certain ‘high-cost’ geographical areas are likely to be hotbeds of political 
opposition to climate change regulation.  As defined by the basic theory of pressure groups, 
groups that face both high potential costs of regulation and low transaction costs of organizing 
will lobby their congressional representatives to block or mitigate such regulation even if this 
regulation is globally efficiency-enhancing.  Recent research on carbon regulation has focused 
on which income groups will bear the costs of the regulation.
4  This research uses computable 
general equilibrium models to prospectively examine how alternative climate policies will affect 
heterogeneous consumers’ welfare.    
           We also pursue a complementary approach by examining the geographical distribution of 
carbon emissions.  Using a county-level dataset based on 2002 carbon emissions (the Purdue 
University Vulcan data set), we study the variation in carbon emissions across the United States.  
The variation is extreme: across the 1,559 counties with at least 25,000 residents in 2002, the 
average carbon emissions per-capita is 7.66 tons, the median is 3.28 tons, and the standard 
deviation is 16.9 tons.
5  With such geographical variation, any meaningful carbon policy will 
impose high costs on some and have a smaller impact on others.  Therefore, political 
                                                 
4 Burtraw, Dallas, Sweeney, Richard and Walls, Margaret, “The Incidence of U.S. Climate Policy: Where You Stand 
Depends on Where You Sit,” Resources for the Future Discussion Paper No. 08-28, 2008. Available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1272667 
5 A ton of carbon dioxide equals 0.367 of a ton of carbon; conversely a ton of carbon is 2.73 tons of carbon dioxide.  
Thus, the average emissions of 7.66 tons of carbon is equivalent to 20.87 tons of carbon dioxide.  compromises to build a coalition in support of climate legislation will likely reduce the economic 
efficiency of whatever legislation emerges. 
To further explore the second-best constraints, we analyze the geographical distribution 
of carbon emissions relative to the political leanings and demographic characteristics of the 
voters in each area.  We document that counties with high carbon emissions per-capita are more 
likely to be poorer and represented by a conservative (based on voting records).  Assuming that 
counties with high carbon emissions will have the most trouble in substituting away from carbon, 
these areas will more heavily bear the cost of carbon regulation.  Conservative, poor, rural areas 
will face a higher carbon bill under a cap and trade system than liberal, rich, urban areas.  This 
compounds the regressivity of any energy tax or cost increase, making it a political necessity that 
some offset be designed. 
Based on data from the League of Conservation Voters (www.lcv.org), Democrats in 
congress are much more likely to vote “pro-environment” on key pieces of legislation than are 
Republicans.  However, a lack of unity in the Democratic Party due to the geographical realities 
of carbon emissions will affect the types of legislation that emerge from congressional house 
committees.  Based on the 110
th Congress, fifteen Democrats in the House represented districts 
with per-capita carbon emissions above the nation’s median, and had personal ideology scores 
(based on voting data) above the median representative’s “conservativeness”.   Such “swing” 
voters could determine what types of legislation pass in this new congress.  
We explore voting behavior from 2007 on anti-carbon legislation to demonstrate that the 
constraints defined in this paper are economically significant.  We show that representatives in 
high carbon districts are more likely to vote against regulation, a behavior captured in the self-interest hypothesis of Stigler (1971) and Peltzman (1975).   Liberal representatives, whose 
constituents have high per-capita incomes and whose district features low per-capita carbon 
emissions, are the most likely to vote in favor of anti-carbon legislation. 
We anticipate that our analysis will motivate economists to consider the theory of the 
second-best in helping design policies to tackle carbon emissions.
6  Much debate exists on the 
relative merits of a carbon tax or cap and trade regulation and the best method to inject revenues 
derived from pricing carbon back into the economy.
7  However, economists must also take into 
account the constraints imposed by the existing carbon emitting infrastructure.  This includes not 
only existing electricity generation facilities (which produce about one-third of carbon 
emissions) but also the transportation and industrial and urban/suburban infrastructures (which 
account for the majority of non-generation facility emissions).   
 
Geographical Carbon Data  
We use the 2002 Vulcan carbon emissions data set.
8   Carbon is measured in tons per-
capita (not carbon dioxide).  The data are based on production, not consumption.
9  We begin our 
empirical work by presenting a series of maps (see Figures One through Six) to highlight the 
                                                 
6 R.G. Lipsey & Kelvin Lancaster (1957), The General Theory of Second Best, The Review of Economic Studies, 
Vol. 24, No. 1., pp. 11-32. 
7 See Joseph Aldy and William Pizer “Issues in Designing U.S. Climate Change Policy,” Resources for the Future, 
2008. Terry Dinan “Trade-offs in Allocation Allowances for CO2 Emissions,” Congressional Budget Office, 
2007. Robert Stavins “A U.S. Cap-and-Trade System to Address Global Climate Change,” Brookings 
Institution, 2007.  Metcalf et. al. (2007) “Analysis of U.S. Greenhouse Gas Tax Proposals,” NBER, 
2008.Gilbert Metcalf, “A Proposal for a U.S. Carbon Tax Swap,” The Hamilton Project, Brookings Institutions, 
2007. 
8 The data and a technical description of how the data set was created can be accessed at  
http://www.purdue.edu/eas/carbon/vulcan/research.php. See Gurnery et. al. 2005. 
9 An alternative approach for studying the geography of carbon dioxide emissions is presented in Glaeser and Kahn 
(2008).  They estimate residential household production of carbon dioxide for a standardized household as a 
function of how much gasoline, electricity and the resulting greenhouse gas emissions from producing this 
power and home heating a household would consume in each of 63 major cities.   geography of per-capita carbon production.  The first map displays the total per-capita 
geography.  The coastal states, such as California, Oregon, and Washington stand out as low-
carbon areas largely due to their proximity to large Northwest hydroelectric facilities and natural 
gas.  In contrast, the Midwest and South have higher than average per-capita emissions largely 
due to their coal intensive electric generation.  In the next set of maps, we disaggregate the total 
carbon emissions into five major sectors; electric utilities, commercial, mobile, residential, and 
industrial.  Commercial sector per-capita emissions are high in the Northeast and low in the 
South, in stark contrast to the geographic distribution of total per-capita emissions (see Figure 
Two).  Industrial sector emissions are concentrated around Texas (see Figure Three), whereas the 
highest emissions in the mobile sector occur around Tennessee (see Figure Four).  Residential 
emissions are focused in Northeast (see Figure Five), and low in much of the Southeast, whereas 
utility-sector emissions are focused in the Rocky Mountain area and the Midwest (see Figure 
Six).  Clearly, the level and geographical distribution of the most important emissions sources 
varies greatly by region.  This suggests that piecemeal legislation dealing source-by-source could 
yield economically less efficient results than comprehensive legislation, since distributional 
issues can be aggregated and dealt with comprehensively.  On the other hand, reaching national 
agreement becomes more difficult given this heterogeneity, so regional solutions (like RGGI in 
the Northeast) becomes more likely. 
To establish some facts about the geographic distribution of electric utility generated 
GHG production, we use electric utility level data from the EPA’s 2006 EGRID database, which 
contains data on more than 4,700 power plants from calendar year 2004.    
“eGRID, or Emissions & Generation Resource Integrated Database, contains 
emissions and resource mix data for virtually every power plant and company 
that generates electricity in the United States.  Emissions data from EPA are carefully integrated with generation data from EIA to produce useful values 
like pounds per megawatt-hour (lbs/MWh) of emissions, which allows direct 
comparison of the environmental attributes of electricity generation.”
10  
We use eGRID’s carbon emissions factor, measured in pounds of carbon dioxide per 
megawatt/hour, for each plant.  Given vast outliers in the data, we assign all plants to the 1
st 
percentile of the empirical distribution if the plant’s emissions factor is less than the 1
st percentile 
and we assign all plants to the 99
th percentile of the emissions factor distribution if a plant’s 
emissions factor exceeds the 99
th percentile.  For each state, we calculate its average carbon 
dioxide emissions factor by constructing a weighted mean using the plant’s power generation as 
the weight.  We also calculate the breakdown of power production by fuel type for each state.  At 
the national level, the average commercial power plant emits 1,358 pounds of carbon dioxide per 
megawatt hour.  In 2004, 48 percent of electricity was generated by coal-fired power plants.  As 
shown in Table One, this average masks huge statistical variation.  For example, California’s 
average emissions factor is 697 pounds per megawatt hour while Indiana’s is 2,091 pounds per 
megawatt hour.  In the Midwest, a significant share of electricity is generated by coal power.
For example, in Ohio and Missouri, coal’s share is over 86 percent.   
Consider one coal fired power plant in Missouri: 
“The cars arrive at places like Meramec, a 56-year-old, 850-megawatt power 
plant in south St. Louis County. The cost of building the sprawling plant has 
long since been paid off by its owner, AmerenUE, an investor-owned utility. 
Because Meramec generates electricity from cheap fuel, it produces cheap 
power. And because Meramec’s operational costs are low and most equipment-
replacement costs have been recouped, AmerenUE often underbids competitors 
in selling excess electricity out of state. These profits give Missouri consumers 
an extra discount. From 1987 to 2007, AmerenUE and its predecessor, Union 
Electric, did not raise electric rates, while power production rose about 65 
percent.”
11  
                                                 
10 http://www.epa.gov/cleanenergy/egrid/index.htm 
11 Barringer, Felicity. "In Areas Fueled by Coal, Climate Bill Sends Chill." New York Times 09 Apr. 09.  Our point is that certain parts of the country are (or should be) well aware that they have 
benefited from cheap coal-based power.  Residents of such areas, and shareholders of such 
companies, have a strong financial incentive to oppose legislation (or lobby for free permits) that 
will raise the price of consuming power generated from coal.
12   A carbon permit price of $50 per 
ton of carbon dioxide is predicted to raise the price of gasoline by 26 percent (assuming a price 
level around $2.50 per gallon without the carbon price) and the price of residential natural gas by 
25 percent and the price of utility coal by 384 percent (see Stavins 2008, Table 3).  A carbon 
dioxide price of around $50 is about what is needed for low/no carbon generation to become 
viable, e.g. nuclear power plants or coal IGCCs with carbon capture and sequestration (CCS).  A 
$50 price is forecasted to occur by 2030 under the Lieberman-Warner Climate Security Act 
proposed in 2007. 
County Carbon Regressions 
We now present some cross-county correlates of 2002 per-capita carbon emissions.  In 
our first set of regressions, we seek to parsimoniously describe what correlates with counties 
having high carbon emissions.  We use county level weighted regressions with per-capita carbon 
emissions as the dependent variable and measures of political ideology and household income as 
                                                 
12 We recognize that shareholders of companies that rely on coal will bear part of the incidence of higher fossil fuel 
prices bought about by carbon legislation.  Given worldwide financial markets, there is no obvious connection 
between one’s location and one’s financial stake in different companies.  In this paper, our focus is on the 
geography of the costs of carbon.  We are implicitly assuming that the ownership of carbon intensive companies 
is uniformly distributed.  If residents of low-carbon producing areas, such as California, owned large 
percentages of carbon intensive companies (such as by owning shares in St. Louis coal companies), then we 
might observe California’s representatives voting against carbon legislation.  As we will show, we do not find 
evidence of this.  the independent variables.
13  County income data is derived from the 2000 Census of Population 
and Housing.   
Congressional representative political ideology is measured with Voteview which is a 
broadly used dataset from political science literature.  Keith Poole’s Voteview data provides us 
with the roster of the House of Representatives in each congress.  Our measure of representative 
ideology is the first factor from “dwnominate”.
14 Poole and Rosenthal estimate this factor from a 
principal-components factor analysis of all congressional roll call votes (not simply 
environmental votes).
15  A more positive score indicates voting a conservative ideology.  In the 
political science literature, this is the most commonly used measure of legislator preference (see 
Heckman and Snyder 1997).
16     
Table Two reports the cross-sectional county regression results based on equation (1). 
Carbon =   β1 + β2*log(Income) +  β3*Ideology + U    ( 1 )  
As shown in columns (1) and (2), conservative ideology is positively correlated with 
county carbon emissions, and per-capita income is negatively correlated with carbon emissions.  
Each of these results is statistically significant.  In column (3), when both are included in the 
regression, the ideology measure is no longer significant but income remains statistically 
                                                 
13 We weight the regressions by county population in the year 2002. 
14 Poole, Keith T. and Howard Poole, “Congress. A Political-Economic History of Roll Call Voting,” Oxford 
University Press, 1997. (see http://voteview.com/dwnomin.htm) 
15 In the first session of the 110
th Congress, the representatives voted on 1,186 separate pieces of legislation (see 
http://voteview.com/house110.htm). 
16 Densely populated counties such as Los Angeles county have several representatives so we average their 
respective ideology scores to calculate the county’s ideology score.  In rural areas, several counties share one 
representative whose ideology is assigned to each of the counties. significant.  In column (4), we re-estimate equation (1) but now use the log of county per-capita 
carbon emissions as the dependent variable.  We find a statistically significant income elasticity 
of -0.6.  The conservative ideology effect is positive and statistically significant. A one standard 
deviation increase in a county’s representative’s conservative ideology is associated with a five 
percent increase in county carbon emissions.   
Table Three disaggregates total county emissions by sector.   In each regression, the 
dependent variable is the county’s per-capita level of emissions from a specific sector. Richer 
urban counties have statistically significantly lower industrial, utility and transport emissions.   
Incomes are higher in cities and in such relatively dense areas, people use public transit more and 
this conserves on greenhouse gas production (Glaeser and Kahn 2008). The evidence 
demonstrates that conservative, poor districts emit more carbon than liberal, rich districts on a 
per-capita basis.  We find no evidence of statistically significant interaction terms.   Looking 
across the sectors, we see that transportation emissions are higher in more conservative areas.  
Again, this may reflect the low use of public transit in such counties.    
Major liberal cities such as Portland, San Francisco, and Boston are not hotbeds of 
manufacturing activity or coal-fired electric power generation.  This is no accident.  These cities 
self-select (via Tiebout sorting) an educated population of amenity-seeking residents who vote in 
favor of regulations to promote “greenness”.  Of course, geography also plays a big role in this 
carbon intensity as well.  The Northeast is remote from coal fields and the Northwest is well 
endowed with hydro resources.  In 2009, these areas feature relatively low average carbon 
factors in part due to regulation’s direct effects (such as California’s energy efficiency 
standards), greater access to adaptation strategies such as a built up public transit network, and in 
part due to regulation pushing energy-intensive manufacturing away.  This suggests that liberal cities will face a lower total carbon bill for complying with new climate legislation.  Such areas 
have already taken steps to “decarbonize,” and are naturally lower in carbon by geographic 
advantage. 
The Political Economy of Congressional Support for Carbon Mitigation   
We adopt a simple cost/benefit framework to analyze support for carbon mitigation 
legislation.  The political economy literature indicates that economic self interest, constituent 
preferences and representative ideology influence voting patterns (Peltzman 1984, Pashigian 
1985, Levitt 1996).  On the benefits side, we assume that liberal representatives gain greater 
benefits from voting against climate change legislation.  They may personally favor such 
regulation and will recognize that their constituents will also support such legislation.   
On the cost side, we focus on differences in per-capita carbon emissions across counties 
and congressional districts.  If a geographical area features higher per-capita carbon production, 
then we assume that this area would face a higher cost from enacting carbon legislation.  We 
appreciate that economic incidence issues arise.  These are beyond the scope of this paper.     
Consumers of carbon intensive goods and owners of assets whose value is derived from fossil 
fuels (i.e. shareholders of coal power plants) will bear part of the incidence of carbon 
regulation.
17  Tracking the geography of such final consumers and asset owners is very 
                                                 
17 Carbon pricing in the energy sector in many locations can have a first-order effect in determining how legislation 
is enacted.  Our data measures carbon emissions at the source of release but the incidence will be determined by 
substitution opportunities at the point of consumption.  For instance, being a dirty plant when most plants in the 
relevant supply curve are dirty will mean that carbon costs will be directly passed to consumers because the 
whole supply curve shifts.  In contrast, being a dirty plant when there are ample substitution opportunities 
means that plant’s relevant position in the supply curve will change and the plant workers and owners will bear 
the costs of carbon pricing. difficult.
18 Our per-capita state carbon emissions measure is highly correlated with state 
endowments of coal.  Based on 2007 data, the top five producers of coal measured in thousands 
of short tons are:  Wyoming (454), West Virginia (153), Kentucky (115), Pennsylvania (65) and 
Montana (43).  These five states account for 72 percent of total U.S coal production.
19    Each of 
these states features much higher per-capita carbon emissions than the national average of 5.35 
tons.   Per-capita carbon emissions in these states in 2002 stand at: 34.8 in Wyoming, 16.82 in  
West Virginia,  9.36 in Kentucky, 5.47 in Pennsylvania, and 9.25 tons in Montana.   These facts 
suggest that areas endowed with coal and fossil fuels use these resources in their own production 
activities.  Thus, our carbon measure in part reflects endowment effects.     
We also examine whether combating climate change is a normal good by testing whether 
richer areas are more likely to support climate legislation.  This simple model predicts that 
geographical areas featuring conservative leaders of poor, rural areas that are carbon intensive 
are the least likely to support climate change mitigation regulation. 
To test for the role of per-capita income, per-capita carbon and overall ideology in 
explaining carbon mitigation voting patterns, we use recent voting data from the 110th Congress.   
In the 110th Congress, representatives voted on various bills that had direct implications for 
mitigating climate change. We rely on the 2007 League of Conservation Voter (“LCV”) 
Scorecard to help us identify key carbon legislation. 
                                                 
18 If asset holders in low carbon states, such as California, consistently hold a “carbon-heavy” stock portfolio, then 
this would represent an omitted variable in our congressional regressions we report below.  In this case, we 
might observe California’s representatives voting against carbon mitigation legislation.   
19 http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/coal/page/acr/table6.html The first bill we look at is House Roll Call 555.   In 2007, the League of Conservation 
Voters included this as a key vote in their scorecard.  
“Conservationists have long asserted that the pollution reductions 
necessary to curb global warming will require more than voluntary initiatives.  
For instance, H.R. 2643, the Interior-Environment appropriations bill, included a 
nonbinding Sense of the Congress resolution, sponsored by Representative Norm 
Dicks (D-WA), that endorses mandatory limits on global warming pollution. 
Representative Joe Barton (R-TX) offered a motion to strike the resolution from 
the bill. On June 26, 2007, the House rejected the motion by a 153-274 vote 
(House roll call vote 555). NO is the pro-environment vote. This marked the first 
time that the House had gone on record endorsing mandatory global warming 
pollution limits.”
20 
We recode this variable to equal zero if a representative voted “yes” and to equal one if a 
representative voted “NO”.  Intuitively, a “one” will equal a pro-environment vote.  The second 
bill that we look at is House Roll Call 827.  This bill is also singled out by the League of 
Conservation Voters in its 2007 Scorecard.   
“To be effective, an energy bill must reduce our dependence on fossil 
fuels, protect the environment, and take meaningful steps to solve global 
warming while creating jobs and saving money. H.R. 3221 met these criteria. It 
set new efficiency standards for appliances, lightings and buildings. It also took 
important steps toward restoring sound stewardship of public lands and helping 
America’s fish and wildlife, public lands, coasts, and oceans adapt to global 
warming. During consideration of H.R. 3221, a comprehensive energy bill, 
Representatives Tom Udall (D-NM), Todd Platts (R-PA) and Ciro Rodriguez 
(D-TX) introduced an amendment requiring utilities to produce at least 15 
percent of their electricity from renewable energy sources by 2020. This 
amendment would save consumers $16.4 billion on energy bills through 2030 
and create tens of thousands of new jobs. At the same time, it would slash global 
warming pollution by 180 million metric tons per year by 2030—equivalent to 
taking more than 29 million cars off the road. On August 4, 2007, the House 




                                                 
20 http://lcv.org/scorecard/2007.pdf 
21 GovTrack.us. H.R. 2776--110th Congress (2007): Renewable Energy and Energy Conservation Tax Act of 2007, 
GovTrack.us (database of federal legislation) <http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=h110-
2776&tab=summary> (accessed Apr 29, 2009). The final bill that we study is Roll Call 835, this was voted on in August 4
th, 2007 (HR 
2776).  It is the vote on the Renewable Energy and Energy Conservation Tax Act of 2007.  It 
amends the Internal Revenue Code provisions relating to renewable energy sources and energy 
conservation.”
22 
Figure Seven presents a map of Congressional support for anti-carbon legislation.  For 
each state, we calculate the share of votes cast in favor of these three bills.  For large states such 
as California, this ratio is more meaningful than for sparsely populated states such as North 
Dakota.  The map shows the coastal divide.  The coastal pacific and the East Coast feature much 
higher anti-carbon voting shares than the Midwest. 
We examine whether representative’s voting on each of these roll calls is a function of 
the District’s per-capita carbon, per-capita income and the representative’s ideology.    
Prob(Vote in Favor of Carbon Mitigation) =  F(Income, Carbon Endowment, Ideology)        (2) 
Columns (1-3) of Table Four reports estimates based on stata’s dprobit command.  The 
dependent variable equals one if the representative voted the pro-environment position.  The 
explanatory variables include; the representative’s overall ideology, per capita carbon emissions, 
and per capita income as the independent variables.  The results in each of the regressions are 
statistically significant and accord with our basic hypothesis: conservative representatives from 
poor, carbon intensive districts are the least likely to vote in favor of environmentally “friendly” 
energy legislation in the 110
th Congress.   Consider the regression results for Bill 827.   A 
                                                 
22 GovTrack.us. H.R. 2776--110th Congress (2007): Renewable Energy and Energy Conservation Tax Act of 2007, 
GovTrack.us (database of federal legislation) <http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=h110-
2776&tab=summary> (accessed Apr 29, 2009). 
 doubling of a congressional district’s carbon emissions per-capita lowers the probability that a 
representative votes in favor of this bill by 17 percentage points.
23  Doubling this district’s per-
capita income increases the probability that a representative votes in favor this bill by 62 
percentage points.  Increasing the ideology measure by one standard deviation (more 
conservative) reduces the probability that a representative votes in favor by 59 percentage 
points.
24    
In the fourth column of Table Four, we average the voting across the three bills and 
estimate a linear probability model.  The results are quite similar to the previous results.  We use 
the regression results from Table Four’s column (4) and predict the probability that a 
representative votes in favor of energy legislation.  In the data appendix, we report this ranking 
sorted from “brownest” to “greenest”.  This ordering shows the names of which representatives 
are least and most likely to vote in favor of anti-carbon legislation as a function of their district’s 
carbon emissions, district per-household income, and the overall ideology of the representative.  
We recognize that the legislation the 111
th Congress will vote on is unlikely to be identical to the 
legislation that the 110
th Congress voted on.  This index is useful for sorting the representatives 
                                                 
23 This marginal effect may not represent the causal effect of per-capita carbon production on congressional voting 
patterns.  As we discussed earlier, we observe a positive correlation between state coal mining activity (a proxy 
for endowments) and state per-capita carbon emissions.  This suggests that our carbon measure may be a proxy 
for a bundle of factors that all reflect self interest in stopping climate change mitigation legislation.  To 
guarantee that the marginal effects reported in Table Four represent “causal effects”, we would need to be 
confident that district unobservables, such as the district residents’ stock holding in fossil fuel intensive 
industries and ownership of carbon intensive firms, is uncorrelated with the observables we include in the 
econometric models.  
24 We recognize that a sparsely populated county featuring a dirty power plant would count as having huge per-
capita carbon emissions based on the approach used in the Vulcan data set.  We have re-run the results in Table 
Four where we measure a county’s per-capita carbon production net of electric utility emissions.  The results are 
quite similar to the ones reported in Table Four. into those whose own ideology and district characteristics give them the highest predicted 
probability of supporting legislation. 
In Table Five, we show that similar political economy patterns are observed in the U.S. 
Senate.  We estimate some simple regressions to provide some facts for U.S. senators based on 
their voting in the 110
th Congress.  In Table Five’s column (1), the dependent variable is the log 
of a state’s per-capita carbon emissions.  We regress this on a senator’s conservative ideology 
score and the log of the state’s household average income, a dummy variable indicating whether 
the senator is a Democrat.  Carbon emissions are higher in states with more conservative senators 
and in poorer states.  Interestingly, emissions are higher in Democrat states.     
We present senate voting results in columns (2) and (3) based on two key pieces of 
climate legislation identified in the 2007 League of Conservation Voters Scorecard.  On June 21
st 
2007, the senate voted 65 to 27 in favor of HR 6 (which we call “Bill 226”).  Part of this 
comprehensive energy legislation proposed to raise automobile fuel efficiency standards to 35 
miles per gallon by 2020.   On June 14
th 2007, the Senate voted on Bill 211 (a “Yes” is the pro-
environment vote).  Senator Jeff Bingaman introduced an amendment to establish a 15 percent 
national renewable energy standard by the year 2020, to which Senator Pete Domenici countered 
with an amendment that would have allowed conventional and polluting sources of energy to 
qualify for credits under the national standard.  This amendment would have effectively 
eliminated any increase in renewable energy production.  The vote on Bill 211 was to table the 
Domenici amendment (see the 2007 League of Conservation Voters Scorecard page eight).  As 
shown in columns (2) and (3) of Table Five, carbon intensive states and conservatives vote 
against these bills.  Perhaps surprisingly, state income is statistically insignificant, which stands 
in contrast to the house results presented in Table Four.   
Carbon Politics and the Composition of the 111
th Congress 
The November 2008 election, led to marked changes in the House of Representatives, the 
leadership, and the composition of key committees.  The media has noted the transition that has 
taken place in the Energy and Commerce Committee leadership.  Michigan’s John Dingell has 
been replaced by Henry Waxman.  This transition has been predicted to increase the likelihood 
that this committee will pursue meaningful carbon regulation.    
Committee composition shifts have implications for the legislation drafted in the Energy 
and Environment Sub-Committee, within the Energy and Commerce Committee.  In Table Six, 
we present carbon and ideology averages for different subsets of the 111
th Congress using the 
Vulcan and Voteview data sets.   The subsets of the congress featuring high average carbon 
levels and high conservative ideology scores are the least likely to vote in favor of carbon 
legislation. 
The average Republican in congress represents a district whose carbon emissions are 
seven percent higher than the average Democrat in congress.  This differential grows for the key 
committee members.  The average Republican member of the Energy and Commerce Committee 
represents a district whose carbon emissions are 21 percent higher than the average Democrat on 
this committee.   While the ideological average differences between Republicans and Democrats 
do not vary much across these subsets, the carbon differential is largest in the important Energy 
and Environment Sub-Committee.   The average Democrat on this committee represents a 
district whose per-capita carbon emissions are 31 percent higher than the average Democrat in 
Congress, and the average Republican on this sub-committee represents a district whose emissions are 20 percent higher than the average Democrat on this committee.  These numbers 
tell a clear story that the Energy and Environment Sub-Committee consists of members of both 
parties who represent carbon intensive districts.  This poses a challenge to adopting legislation 
that will provide meaningful reductions in carbon emissions. 
 
Conclusion 
This paper has utilized several independent data sets to take a new look at the geography 
of carbon emissions across the United States and the geography of voting patterns on recent 
congressional legislation intended to address climate change.  By combining data on county per-
capita carbon emissions, county demographic data, and congressional voting data, we have 
uncovered several facts which will likely play an important role in constraining climate 
legislation.  Economists and policy makers will need to address these constraints if they want to 
help design climate legislation that will have a meaningful effect on controlling carbon emissions 
and be passed by members of congress. 
First, there are regions of the nation such as the Pacific West and the Northeast with 
much lower per-capita carbon emissions than Midwestern states.   Constituents of these “low-
carbon” states will face lower direct costs from any anti-carbon legislation.  Whether such 
constituents would face high “general equilibrium” costs remains an open question and is 
directly a function of what other costs will be imposed to allow for meaningful controls on 
carbon emissions in the U.S. and abroad.    While we have focused on spatial differences in the 
cost of achieving climate mitigation goals, climate change mitigation will offer differential 
benefits depending on geography.  A coastal liberal city such as San Francisco will gain greater 
benefits from mitigating climate change and will face lower costs to comply with any new carbon legislation.   Representatives from such areas face a Coasian challenge to provide implicit 
cross-subsidies to other regions where the costs of carbon control will be substantially higher. 
Second, per-capita carbon emissions are higher in poorer counties and hence are unlikely 
to support climate legislation due to the costs that such legislation will impose on them.   Based 
on voting in the 110th Congress, we find evidence of congressional self interest.  Representatives 
whose districts are richer and less carbon intensive (based on production data) vote for climate 
change mitigation legislation.  This finding has direct implications for the need for a climate 
policy that controls carbon emissions while addressing the distributional effects across space of 
new carbon regulation.   However, one chilling effect is our robust finding of a large ideology 
effect.  Holding district per-capita carbon and income constant, conservatives tend to vote 
against climate change mitigation legislation.   
Finally, we have explored the composition of the key committee in the 111th Congress 
that is charged with drafting climate legislation.  The imperative to design legislation that 
recognizes the need to arrive at a second-best solution, where winners compensate losers, is 
highlighted by the fact that the select members of these Committees are from districts with much 
higher per-capita carbon emission than the average members of the House from the same 
political party.   
The consequences of the existing carbon geography, voting preferences, and the 
distribution of income would suggest that there are at least three potential policy outcomes: 
1)       Deadlock. This could create highly watered down legislation and environmentally 
ineffective policy.   For instance, after the first year of experience with the European 
emissions trading system, there was an oversupply of permits and the price plummeted.
25   
                                                 
25 See for instance, Ellerman and Buchner (2007) 2)   Price offsets for carbon-intensive regions. This could yield a transfer of wealth with little 
change in behavior.   For example, there could be free allowances to producers 
proportional to historic emissions.  This could be counterproductive if there is no change 
in which plants are producing energy as it might just raise prices to consumers, thereby 
increasing producer surplus with little change in production (except through consumers 
using less energy).
26     
3)   Anti-regressive policies.   In contrast to free distribution of allowances, this could involve 
rebates  and/or other tax or income offsets used to protect low income consumers.   It 
could also involve policies providing  subsidies for out-of-the money but cleaner 
investment.   
Our work documents the geographical challenges faced by the Obama Administration in 
getting climate legislation passed and provides an important set of constraints for economists to 
consider.  Since industrial, transportation, and utility emissions are not geographically correlated, 
these sectors may offer a pathway to negotiating compromises.  Economists who seek to mitigate 
the carbon externality would gain from openly acknowledging the spatial distributional impacts 
introduced by efficiency enhancing policies and recognizing that place-based politicians and 
their constituents are sensitive to these effects.   
                                                 
26 See http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601072&sid=aD9LzrWO2KUE&refer=energy. 
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Factor Coal  Hydro  Nuclear 
Natural 
Gas Oil  Other 
AK 1,106  7%  23%  0%  56%  6%  9% 
AL 1,299  46%  8%  23%  8%  0%  14% 
AR 1,280  50%  7%  30%  10%  0%  3% 
AZ 1,219  41%  7%  28%  24%  0%  0% 
CA 697  2%  18%  16%  52%  0%  13% 
CO 1,978  75%  2%  0%  22%  0%  1% 
CT 754  15%  1%  51%  25%  0%  8% 
DC 3,614  0%  0%  0%  0%  100%  0% 
DE 1,804  71%  0%  0%  0%  23%  6% 
FL 1,348  36%  0%  6%  28%  1%  30% 
GA 1,382  65%  3%  27%  4%  0%  1% 
HI 1,655  16%  1%  0%  0%  12%  72% 
IA 1,942  82%  2%  11%  2%  0%  3% 
ID 144  1%  78%  0%  15%  0%  6% 
IL 1,154  50%  0%  48%  2%  0%  0% 
IN 2,092  95%  0%  0%  1%  0%  3% 
KS 1,870  74%  0%  22%  3%  0%  1% 
KY 2,051  92%  4%  0%  0%  0%  4% 
LA 1,201  26%  1%  19%  42%  0%  12% 
MA 1,213  23%  2%  13%  45%  1%  16% 
MD 1,293  38%  5%  28%  1%  1%  27% 
ME 772  6%  16%  0%  55%  0%  22% 
MI 1,399  59%  1%  19%  13%  7%  2% 
MN 1,586  68%  1%  25%  1%  0%  4% 
MO 1,877  86%  2%  9%  3%  0%  0% 
MS 1,409  37%  0%  25%  19%  0%  18% 
MT 1,572  63%  33%  0%  0%  0%  4% 
NC 1,218  61%  4%  32%  2%  0%  1% 
ND 2,386  0%  5%  0%  0%  0%  95% 
NE 1,503  64%  3%  32%  1%  0%  0% 
NH 779  17%  6%  43%  23%  0%  12% 
NJ 709  19%  0%  19%  29%  0%  33% 
NM 1,954  89%  0%  0%  9%  0%  2% 
NV 1,573  49%  4%  0%  44%  0%  3% 
NY 891  17%  17%  29%  15%  0%  21% 
OH 1,776  88%  0%  11%  1%  0%  0% 
OK 1,717  59%  5%  0%  34%  0%  2% 
OR 456  7%  64%  0%  25%  0%  4% 
PA 1,210  53%  1%  36%  5%  0%  5% 
RI 1,065  0%  0%  0%  99%  0%  1% 
SC 904  40%  2%  46%  4%  0%  8% 
SD 1,215  48%  48%  0%  2%  0%  2% 
TN 1,255  60%  11%  29%  0%  0%  0% 
TX 1,471  20%  0%  11%  47%  0%  21% 




Factor Coal  Hydro  Nuclear 
Natural 
Gas Oil  Other 
VA 1,194  53%  2%  37%  6%  0%  2% 
VT 7  0%  20%  71%  0%  1%  8% 
WA 360  11%  70%  9%  8%  0%  2% 
WI 1,711  73%  3%  6%  4%  13%  1% 
WV 1,988  96%  2%  0%  0%  0%  2% 
WY 2,277  68%  1%  0%  0%  0%  30% 
 
The Carbon Dioxide Emissions Factor is measured in pounds of carbon dioxide emissions per megawatt-
hour.   The composition columns show the share of the state’s total generation in 2004 by source.Table Two: County Level Regressions of Per-Capita Carbon Emissions  
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
 Level  Level  Level  Natural  Log 
Congressman 
ideology score 
1.692   0.782  0.114 
[0.670]***   [0.677]  [0.031]*** 
Log household 
income 
 -8.158  -7.895  -0.592 
 [1.107]***  [1.129]***  [0.052]*** 
Constant 5.263  94.357  91.452  7.688 
 [0.261]***  [12.083]***  [12.327]***  [0.570]*** 
Observations 3139  3139  3139  3139 
R-squared 0.002  0.017  0.017 0.050 
 
The dependent variable is a county’s per-capita carbon production in 2002.  The household income data is 
from the 2000 Census of Population and Housing and the ideology measure is based on the county’s 
average representative ideology score in the 106
th Congress.   The regressions are weighted by a county’s 
population in 2002.  Standard errors are presented in brackets.  Coefficient estimate that are statistically 
significant at the 10% level are indicated by a “*”, at the 5% level by “**”, and at the 1% level by “***”. 
 Table Three: County Level Regressions of Per-Capita Carbon Emissions by Sector 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Commercial  Industrial  Residential  Utility  Transportation 
Congressman 
ideology score 
-0.062 0.002 -0.099 0.547 0.362 
[0.024]** [0.279]  [0.010]*** [0.594] [0.029]*** 
Log household 
income 
0.090 -2.17 0.133  -5.109  -0.717 
[0.040]** [0.465]***  [0.016]*** [0.990]*** [0.048]*** 
Constant  -0.771 24.671 -1.090 57.871 9.362 
 [0.439]*  [5.082]***  [0.179]***  [10.807]***  [0.528]*** 
Observations  3139 3139 3139 3139 3139 
R-squared 0.005  0.007  0.061  0.01  0.129 
 
In each regression, the dependent variable is the per-capita emissions from that sector.  Each regression is weighted 
by the county’s population in 2002.   Standard errors are presented in brackets.  Coefficient estimate that are 
statistically significant at the 10% level are indicated by a “*”, at the 5% level by “**”, and at the 1% level by 
“***”. Table Four: Congressional Voting on Anti-Carbon Legislation in the 110th Congress 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 






Log (carbon per 
capita) 
-0.007 -.244  -.159  -.043 
[.008]* [.060]*** [.095]* [.016]*** 
Log (District 
income per capita) 
.026 .901 .912 .220 
[.033]*** [.188]*** [.287]*** [.044]*** 
Congressman 
ideology score 
-.111 -1.149  -2.193 -.799 
[.126]*** [.096]*** [.255]*** [.019]*** 
Obs. prob.  .638  .534  .541   
pred. prob.  .995  .572  .602   
Observations  420 406 408 391 
Chi2 427.93  313.84  470.91   
prob>chi2 0  0  0   
R-squared       .828 
 
Columns (1)-(3) report estimated marginal changes in probabilities based on stata’s “dprobit” command.  The 
standard deviation for congressman ideology score equals .51.   The dependent variable in column (4) is based on 
the share of the “pro-environment” votes the representative cast on the three bills listed in columns (1-3).   Standard 
errors are presented in brackets.  Coefficient estimate that are statistically significant at the 10% level are indicated 
by a “*”, at the 5% level by “**”, and at the 1% level by “***”. Table Five:   Senator Voting on Anti-Carbon Legislation 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
 
Log(per-capita 
state Carbon)  Bill 226  Bill 211 
Senator ideology  
score 
.630 -.563 -.577 
[.228]*** [.117]***  [.541]*** 
Log household 
income 
-1.932 -.286  .058 
[.325]*** [.447]  [.205] 
Democrat .404     
Dummy [.210]*     
Log(carbon per     -.227  -.173 
capita)   [.123]*  [.163]** 
Constant 22.538    
 [3.543]***     
Obs. prob.    .707  .589 
Pred. prob.    .789  .964 
Observations 102  92  95 
R-squared 0.409     
Chi2   36.58  105.14 
Prob>Chi2   0  0 
 
In column (1), the dependent variable is the log of the state’s per-capita carbon emissions. In columns (2) and (3), 
the dependent variable is a dummy variable that equals one if the senator voted in favor of this bill.  Columns (2)-(3) 
report estimated marginal changes in probabilities based on stata’s “dprobit” command.  Standard errors are 
presented in brackets.  Coefficient estimate that are statistically significant at the 10% level are indicated by a “*”, at 
the 5% level by “**”, and at the 1% level by “***”. 
 Table Six: Average Ideology & Carbon in the 110th Congress 
 
Tons of 
Carbon   Ideology 
Average Member  5.37  0.026 
Average Democrat  5.03  -0.418 
Average Republican  5.77  0.544 
Average Member of the Energy and 
Commerce Committee   5.92  -0.016 
Average Democratic Member of the Energy 
and Commerce Committee  5.46  -0.4 
Average Republican Member of the Energy 
and Commerce Committee  6.63  0.578 
Average Member of The Environment and 
Energy Sub-Committee  7.1  -0.032 
Average Democrat Member of the 
Environment and Energy Sub-committee  6.6  -0.38 
Average Republican Member of the 
Environment and Energy Sub-Committee   7.91  0.519 
Average Member no longer in Congress  6.52  .335 
 
Tons of carbon’s standard deviation equals 4.59 and the ideology measure’s standard deviation 
equals .51.  
  Figure One: Total Carbon Per-Capita Emissions Figure Two: The Commercial Sector's Per-Capita Carbon Emissions Figure Three: The Industrial Sector's Per-Capita Carbon Emissions Figure Four: The Mobile Sector's Per-Capita Carbon Emissions Figure Five: The Residential Sector's Per-Capita Carbon Emissions   
Figure Six: The Utility Sector's Per-capita Carbon Emissions 
 
 Figure Seven: State Average Congressional Voting in 2007 on Three Carbon Mitigation 
Bills  
  
Appendix One:   A Ranking of the 110









of Voting  
Pro-Green 




TX 14  PAUL  0  0 
GA 10  BROUN  0.18  0 
GA 3  WESTMORE  0.2  0 
AZ 6  FLAKE  0.2  0 
AZ 2  FRANKS  0.21  0 
GA 9  DEAL  0.22  0 
CO 5  LAMBORN  0.23  0 
ID 1  SALI  0.23  1 
IA 5  KING  0.23  0 
TX 5  HENSARLIN  0.24  0 
SC 3  BARRETT  0.24  0 
TN 2  DUNCAN    0.24  0 
WI 5  SENSENBR  0.25  0 
AZ 3  SHADEGG  0.25  0 
NC 10  MCHENRY  0.25  0 
FL 1  MILLER 0.25  0 
IN 6  PENCE  0.25  0 
TX 19  NEUGEBAUE  0.26  0 
TX 13  THORNBER  0.26  0 
NC 5  FOXX  0.27  0 
OH 4  JORDAN    0.27  0 
TN 1  DAVIS    0.27  1 
FL 6  STEARNS  0.27  0 
UT 3  CANNON  0.28  1 
FL 24  FEENEY 0.28  1 
GA 11  GINGREY  0.28  0 
TX 11  CONAWAY  0.28  0 
TX 1  GOHMERT  0.28  0 
NE 3  SMITH  0.28  0 
WY 1  CUBIN  0.29  1 
GA 1  KINGSTON    0.29  0 
CO 6  TANCREDO  0.29  1 
CO 4  MUSGRAVE  0.29  1 
PA 16  PITTS  0.3  0 
MN 6  BACHMANN  0.3  0 
CA 40  ROYCE  0.3  0 
GA 7  LINDER  0.3  0 
WI 1  RYAN  0.3  0 
OH 1  CHABOT 0.3  1 
MI 2  HOEKSTRA  0.3  0 
CA 46  ROHRABAC  0.31  0 CA 2  HERGER  0.31  0 
NC 6  COBLE  0.31  0 
TX 2  POE  0.31  0 
NC 9  MYRICK  0.31  0 
SC 4  INGLIS  0.31  0 
TN 7  BLACKBURN    0.31  0 
TX 6  BARTON  0.31  0 
NM 2  PEARCE 0.31  1 
OK 1  SULLIVAN  0.31  0 
SC 2  WILSON    0.32  0 
MO 7  BLUNT  0.32  0 
VA 5  GOODE  0.32  1 
VA 6  GOODLATT  0.32  0 
MO 2  AKIN  0.32  0 
TX 8  BRADY  0.33  0 
TX 32  SESSIONS  0.33  0 
PA 9  SHUSTER  0.33  0 
TX 3  JOHNSON  0.33  0 
LA 6  BAKER  0.34  1 
KY 5  ROGERS    0.34  0 
CA 22  MCCARTHY  0.34  0 
FL 14  MACK  0.34  0 
LA 5  ALEXANDER  0.34  0 
FL 12  PUTNAM  0.34  0 
MI 7  WALBERG  0.34  1 
IL 19  SHIMKUS  0.34  0 
KY 4  DAVIS    0.34  0 
AL   1  BONNER  0.34  0 
TX 31  CARTER 0.34  0 
TN 3  WAMP  0.34  0 
LA 4  MCCRERY  0.34  1 
VA 7  CANTOR  0.34  0 
FL 15  WELDON  0.34  1 
KY 2  LEWIS  0.34  1 
CA 19  RADANOVI  0.35  0 
IN 4  BUYER  0.35  0 
OH 8  BOEHNER  0.35  0 
WI 6  PETRI  0.35  0 
IL 16  MANZULLO  0.35  0 
UT 1  BISHOP 0.35  0 
OK 5  FALLIN  0.35  0 
NJ 5  GARRETT  0.35  0 
IN 5  BURTON    0.35  0 
CA 48  CAMPBELL    0.35  0 
OK 3  LUCAS  0.35  0 
CA 50  BILBRAY  0.35  0 
GA 6  PRICE  0.35  0 
MD 6  BARTLETT    0.35  0 
KY 1  WHITFIEL  0.35  0 FL 7  MICA  0.35  0 
CA 21  NUNES  0.36  0 
MO 9  HULSHOF  0.36  1 
AL   2  EVERETT   0.36  1 
OK 4  COLE  0.36  0 
OH 2  SCHMIDT  0.36  0 
AL   4  ADERHOLT  0.36  0 
AL   6  BACHUS  0.36  0 
NV 2  HELLER 0.36  0 
FL 5  BROWN-WAI  0.36  0 
LA 7  BOUSTANY  0.36  0 
MT 1  REHBERG  0.36  0 
TX 12  GRANGER  0.36  0 
CA 3  LUNGREN  0.36  0 
MS 1  WICKER 0.36  0 
AL   3  ROGERS   0.36  0 
WA 4  HASTINGS    0.37  0 
TX 7  CULBERSO  0.37  0 
MN 2  KLINE  0.37  0 
MO 6  GRAVES    0.37  0 
SC 1  BROWN 0.37  0 
TX 24  MARCHANT  0.37  0 
VA 4  FORBES 0.37  0 
AR 3  BOOZMAN  0.37  0 
NE 2  TERRY  0.37  0 
WA 5  MCMORRIS  0.38  0 
MI 4  CAMP  0.38  0 
FL 8  KELLER 0.38  1 
PA 5  PETERSON  0.38  1 
CA 49  ISSA  0.38  0 
IN 3  SOUDER  0.38  0 
TX 26  BURGESS  0.39  0 
AZ 1  RENZI  0.39  1 
KS 4  TIAHRT 0.39  0 
VA 1  DAVIS    0.39  0 
FL 4  CRENSHAW  0.39  0 
LA 1  JINDAL  0.39  1 
CA 25  MCKEON  0.39  0 
VA 2  DRAKE  0.39  1 
KS 1  MORAN 0.39  0 
CA 42  MILLER  0.4  0 
IL 14  HASTERT  0.4  0 
NC 8  HAYES  0.4  1 
TX 10  MCCAUL 0.4  0 
WV 2  CAPITO  0.4  0 
NY 26  REYNOLDS  0.4  1 
PA 3  ENGLISH  0.4  1 
CA 52  HUNTER  0.4  1 
CA 4  DOOLITTL  0.4  1 IA 4  LATHAM  0.4  0 
MS 3  PICKERIN  0.4  1 
FL 13  BUCHANAN  0.41  0 
MO 8  EMERSON  0.41  0 
FL 25  DIAZ-BALA  0.41  0 
OH 12  TIBERI  0.41  0 
OR 2  WALDEN  0.41  0 
TX 21  SMITH  0.41  0 
MI 8  ROGERS    0.41  0 
NE 1  FORTENBE  0.41  0 
NY 13  FOSSELLA  0.41  1 
CA 41  LEWIS  0.41  0 
OH 7  HOBSON  0.42  1 
IL 6  ROSKAM  0.42  0 
AK 1  YOUNG 0.42  0 
MI 3  EHLERS 0.42  0 
ID 2  SIMPSON  0.42  0 
MI 10  MILLER  0.42  0 
CA 45  BONO  0.42  0 
IL 11  WELLER  0.42  1 
OH 5  GILLMOR  0.43  0 
MI 6  UPTON   0.43  0 
IL 18  LAHOOD  0.43  1 
CA 44  CALVERT  0.43  0 
IL 13  BIGGERT  0.43  0 
FL 10  YOUNG  0.43  0 
OH 15  PRYCE  0.43  1 
FL 21  DIAZ-BAL  0.44  0 
CA 26  DREIER  0.44  0 
OH 3  TURNER  0.44  0 
CA 24  GALLEGLY  0.44  0 
FL 18  ROS-LEHT  0.44  0 
NY 29  KUHL  0.45  1 
PA 19  PLATTS  0.45  0 
TX 4  HALL  0.45  0 
NM 1  WILSON    0.46  1 
MI 11  MCCOTTER  0.46  0 
PA 18  MURPHY  0.46  0 
PA 15  DENT  0.46  0 
OH 16  REGULA 0.46  1 
MN 3  RAMSTAD  0.47  1 
NY 23  MCHUGH  0.47  0 
NC 3  JONES  0.47  0 
IL 15  JOHNSON  0.47  0 
NY 25  WALSH  0.47  1 
NV 3  PORTER 0.47  1 
DE 1  CASTLE 0.48  0 
MI 9  KNOLLENB  0.48  1 
OH 14  LATOURET  0.48  0 NJ 2  LOBIONDO  0.5  0 
NJ 11  FRELINGH  0.5  0 
VA 10  WOLF  0.5  0 
MD 1  GILCHRES  0.51  1 
NY 3  KING  0.51  0 
NJ 3  SAXTON  0.51  1 
WA 8  REICHERT  0.51  0 
PA 6  GERLACH  0.52  0 
NJ 4  SMITH  0.52  0 
IL 10  KIRK  0.53  0 
NJ 7  FERGUSON    0.55  1 
OK 2  BOREN  0.56  0 
IN 8  ELLSWORTH  0.58  0 
CT 4  SHAYS  0.58  1 
GA 12  BARROW 0.6  0 
AL   5  CRAMER  0.61  1 
NC 11  SHULER 0.62  0 
PA 10  CARNEY 0.62  0 
PA 12  MURTHA  0.62  0 
TX 28  CUELLAR  0.62  0 
IN 2  DONNELLY  0.62  0 
WV 1  MOLLOHAN  0.62  0 
TN 4  DAVIS    0.62  0 
LA 3  MELANCON  0.63  0 
AR 4  ROSS  0.63  0 
PA 4  ALTMIRE  0.63  0 
AL   7  DAVIS   0.63  0 
TN 8  TANNER  0.63  0 
IN 9  HILL  0.63  0 
MS 4  TAYLOR    0.63  0 
ND 1  POMEROY  0.63  0 
VA 9  BOUCHER  0.63  0 
OH 18  SPACE  0.63  0 
TN 6  GORDON  0.64  0 
TX 27  ORTIZ  0.64  0 
OH 6  WILSON    0.64  0 
MN 7  PETERSON  0.64  0 
MO 4  SKELTON  0.64  0 
KS 2  BOYDA 0.64  1 
TX 15  HINOJOSA  0.65  0 
FL 2  BOYD  0.65  0 
UT 2  MATHESON  0.65  0 
GA 2  BISHOP  0.65  0 
TX 17  EDWARDS  0.65  0 
CA 20  COSTA  0.65  0 
GA 8  MARSHALL    0.66  0 
NC 7  MCINTYRE  0.66  0 
FL 16  MAHONEY  0.66  1 
CO 3  SALAZAR  0.66  1 TX 22  LAMPSON  0.67  1 
PA 11  KANJORSK  0.68  0 
AR 1  BERRY   0.68  0 
AZ 8  GIFFORDS  0.68  0 
SD 1  HERSETH  0.68  0 
TN 5  COOPER  0.68  0 
PA 17  HOLDEN 0.68  0 
KY 6  CHANDLER    0.68  0 
CA 18  CARDOZA  0.68  0 
TX 29  GREEN  0.69  0 
WV 3  RAHALL 0.69  0 
TX 16  REYES  0.69  0 
AR 2  SNYDER  0.69  0 
SC 6  CLYBURN  0.7  0 
TX 20  GONZALEZ  0.7  0 
AZ 5  MITCHELL  0.7  0 
NC 1  BUTTERFI  0.7  0 
WI 3  KIND  0.7  0 
SC 5  SPRATT 0.71  0 
GA 13  SCOTT  0.71  0 
ME 2  MICHAUD  0.71  0 
NY 20  GILLIBRAND  0.71  0 
NY 27  HIGGINS 0.71  0 
IL 17  HARE  0.71  0 
IA 3  BOSWELL  0.72  0 
IA 1  BRALEY  0.72  0 
MD 2  RUPPERSBE  0.72  0 
NC 2  ETHERIDG  0.72  0 
WI 8  KAGEN  0.72  0 
TX 23  RODRIGUEZ  0.72  0 
LA 2  JEFFERSO  0.72  1 
MO 3  CARNAHAN  0.72  0 
IL 12  COSTELLO  0.72  0 
IL 8  BEAN  0.72  0 
NY 24  ARCURI  0.73  0 
MI 5  KILDEE 0.73  0 
PA 14  DOYLE  0.73  0 
MN 1  WALZ  0.73  0 
FL 3  BROWN 0.73  0 
NC 13  MILLER  0.73  0 
CA 11  MCNERNEY  0.73  0 
NV 1  BERKLEY    0.73  0 
WA 6  DICKS  0.73  0 
MI 1  STUPAK  0.73  0 
CO 7  PERLMUTTER  0.73  0 
PA 8  MURPHY  0.73  0 
FL 17  MEEK  0.74  0 
WA 9  SMITH  0.74  0 
PA 1  BRADY  0.74  0 WA 3  BAIRD  0.74  0 
IL 3  LIPINSKI  0.74  0 
CA 43  BACA  0.74  0 
KY 3  YARMUTH  0.74  0 
KS 3  MOORE   0.74  0 
IA 2  LOEBSACK  0.74  0 
MS 2  THOMPSON  0.75  0 
OR 5  HOOLEY  0.75  1 
TX 9  GREEN  0.75  0 
IN 1  VISCLOSK  0.75  0 
PA 7  SESTAK 0.75  0 
FL 22  KLEIN  0.75  0 
OH 17  RYAN  0.75  0 
OH 9  KAPTUR  0.75  0 
WA 2  LARSEN 0.75  0 
NM 3  UDALL  0.75  1 
CA 53  DAVIS    0.75  0 
TN 9  COHEN  0.76  0 
MD 5  HOYER  0.76  0 
NJ 13  SIRES  0.76  0 
FL 11  CASTOR 0.76  0 
MI 15  DINGELL  0.76  0 
PA 2  FATTAH  0.76  0 
RI 2  LANGEVIN  0.76  0 
NY 16  SERRANO  0.76  0 
PA 13  SCHWARTZ  0.77  0 
NY 7  CROWLEY    0.77  0 
MI 12  LEVIN  0.77  0 
MD 4  WYNN  0.77  0 
CA 34  ROYBAL-A  0.77  0 
CA 29  SCHIFF  0.77  0 
WI 7  OBEY  0.77  0 
NH 2  HODES  0.77  0 
CA 37  MILLENDE  0.77  0 
CO 2  UDALL  0.77  0 
NY 6  MEEKS  0.77  0 
TX 25  DOGGETT  0.77  0 
CA 31  BECERRA  0.77  0 
CT 2  COURTNEY  0.77  0 
MO 5  CLEAVER  0.77  0 
CA 1  THOMPSON  0.77  0 
CA 36  HARMAN  0.77  0 
ME 1  ALLEN  0.78  1 
NH 1 
SHEA-
PORTER 0.78  0 
NY 17  ENGEL  0.78  0 
AZ 4  PASTOR 0.78  0 
TX 18  JACKSON-    0.78  0 
NY 2  ISRAEL   0.78  0 
IL 1  RUSH  0.78  0 CA 28  BERMAN  0.78  0 
VA 8  MORAN 0.78  0 
VA 3  SCOTT  0.78  0 
CA 37  RICHARDSON    0.78  0 
OH 11  JONES  0.78  0 
CT 5  MURPHY  0.78  0 
NY 15  RANGEL 0.78  0 
IL 5  EMANUEL  0.79  0 
RI 1  KENNEDY  0.79  0 
HI 1  ABERCROM  0.79  0 
MA 9  LYNCH  0.79  0 
NY 1  BISHOP  0.79  0 
TX 30  JOHNSON  0.79  0 
NJ 1  ANDREWS  0.79  0 
MN 8  OBERSTAR  0.79  0 
CA 47  SANCHEZ  0.79  0 
IN 7  CARSON    0.79  0 
NY 21  MCNULTY  0.79  1 
CA 5  MATSUI 0.79  0 
NY 9  WEINER 0.79  0 
WI 4  MOORE   0.8  0 
MD 7  CUMMINGS  0.8  0 
NY 4  MCCARTHY  0.8  0 
CA 10  TAUSCHER  0.8  0 
MI 13  KILPATRI  0.8  0 
NC 4  PRICE  0.8  0 
MD 3  SARBANES  0.8  0 
MN 4  MCCOLLUM  0.8  0 
CO 1  DEGETTE  0.8  0 
OR 1  WU  0.8  0 
MO 1  CLAY  0.8  0 
NY 10  TOWNS  0.8  0 
NY 19  HALL  0.81  0 
NJ 9  ROTHMAN  0.81  0 
FL 20  WASSERMA  0.81  0 
OH 13  SUTTON 0.81  0 
MA 2  NEAL  0.81  0 
CA 27  SHERMAN    0.81  0 
CA 38  NAPOLITA  0.82  0 
VT 1  WELCH 0.82  0 
FL 19  WEXLER  0.82  0 
IL 4  GUTIERRE  0.82  0 
NY 5  ACKERMAN  0.82  0 
NC 12  WATT  0.82  0 
NJ 8  PASCRELL  0.82  0 
FL 23  HASTINGS    0.83  0 
CT 3  DELAURO  0.83  0 
NY 28  SLAUGHTE  0.83  0 
CT 1  LARSON  0.83  0 NY 12  VELAZQUE  0.83  0 
GA 4  JOHNSON  0.84  0 
OR 4  DEFAZIO  0.84  0 
CA 32  SOLIS  0.84  0 
CA 33  WATSON  0.84  0 
CA 39  SANCHEZ  0.84  0 
WA 1  INSLEE  0.84  0 
IL 7  DAVIS    0.84  0 
CA 16  LOFGREN  0.84  0 
CA 17  FARR  0.84  0 
MD 8  VAN  HOLLE  0.84  0 
MA 5  TSONGAS  0.85  0 
AZ 7  GRIJALVA  0.85  0 
CA 23  CAPPS  0.85  0 
NY 14  MALONEY  0.85  0 
HI 2  HIRONO  0.85  0 
MA 10  DELAHUNT  0.85  0 
CA 12  LANTOS 0.85  0 
IL 2  JACKSON    0.85  0 
MA 5  MEEHAN  0.85  0 
OR 3  BLUMENAU    0.86  0 
NY 18  LOWEY  0.86  0 
CA 14  ESHOO  0.86  0 
WI 2  BALDWIN    0.86  0 
CA 8  PELOSI  0.86  0 
MA 8  CAPUANO  0.86  0 
NY 11  CLARKE 0.86  0 
MA 3  MCGOVERN  0.87  0 
MN 5  ELLISON  0.87  0 
NY 22  HINCHEY  0.87  0 
MI 14  CONYERS  0.88  0 
NY 8  NADLER  0.88  0 
MA 6  TIERNEY  0.89  0 
GA 5  LEWIS  0.89  0 
NJ 10  PAYNE  0.89  0 
CA 15  HONDA  0.89  0 
CA 51  FILNER  0.89  0 
MA 7  MARKEY  0.9  0 
MA 1  OLVER  0.9  0 
NJ 6  PALLONE  0.9  0 
CA 35  WATERS 0.9  0 
MA 4  FRANK  0.9  0 
NJ 12  HOLT  0.9  0 
OH 10  KUCINICH  0.9  0 
CA 30  WAXMAN  0.9  0 
CA 7  MILLER 0.91  0 
IL 9  SCHAKOWS  0.93  0 
CA 9  LEE  0.94  0 
CA 6  WOOLSEY  0.96  0 CA 13  STARK  0.98  0 
WA 7  MCDERMOT  1  0 
 
 
 